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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

A RATIONALE FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN SURETYSHIP CASES
By H. W. ARANr*
is a long way from Lord Nottingham's statement that the
statute of frauds was "so wise and beneficial to the public
that it deserved a subsidy"' to the recent suggestion that the provisions of section four "are not only not expedient, but even
actively harmful."'2 None of these has received more attention
f.rom courts and writers than the provision that special promises
to answer for the debts, defaults and miscarriages of other persons must be evidenced by a writing. 3 Yet, the complaint was
recently made that "in the year of grace, 1913, we -have to go
to the court of appeal to obtain a decision on so much of section
4 as relates to guaranties" 4 'and an examination of the current
reports or digests indicates that the end is not yet. Notwithstanding, however, this provision continues to be a part of the
law in practically every American state and appears to be in no
imminent danger of repeal.5
In order to understand the enactment of this provision, it
will be necessary to recall some of the rules of procedure and
evidence obtaining at the time of its passage. Trial by jury was
in a transition state. The medieval method of controlling the
jury by writ of attaint was obsolete and the sixteenth and early
seventeenth century method of controlling it by fine and imprisonment had been held illegal, 6 because the jury might still decide
a case from its own knowledge of facts. The device of obtaining
an order-for a new trial ,rhen the verdict was against the evidence,
so widely used now, was then in its infancy. The requirement
*Dean of the Law School, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
T

'See Popham v. Eyre, (1774) Lofft 800. Commenting upon this
encomium, Lord St. Leonards said: "We know every line of it has
cost a subsidy." RealProperty Statutes (1862) Preface.
26 Holdsworth, History of English Law 390, 396. See also 29 L.
Quart. Rev. 247; 1 L. Quart. Rev. 1-8; Willis, The Statute of Frauds:
A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L. J. 427.
3(1676) 29 Car. II, sec. 4.
4(1913) 29 L. Quart. Rev. 247. Compare 1 L. Quart. Rev. 1, 7-8.
5
In this article, "statute of frauds" or "statute" will be understood
to mean the particular provision here being discussed.
6
Bushell's -Case, (1670) Vaughan's Rep. 135.
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that certain transactions should be proved only by written evidence
placed a desirable limitation upon this uncontrolled discretion of
the jury. Furthermore, the rtile disqualifying parties to the
action, their husbands or wives and persons interested in the
result of the litigation often prevented the person who knew most
about the facts from testifying. The requirement that the promise
be proved by writing signed by the promisor resulted in much
more satisfactory proof and made success in actions upon fabri7
cated promises unlikely, if not impossible.
'Before discussing the different types of cases involving the
applicability of this provision, it will be profitable to throw into
as bold relief as possible the specific danger that led to its enactment. In a leading American case, it was stated as follows:
"The object of the statute manifestly was, to secure the highest
and most satisfactory species of evidence, in a case, where a
party, without apparent benefit to himself, enters into stipulations of suretyship, and where there would be great temptation,
on the part of a creditor, in danger of losing his debt by the
insolvency of his debtor, to support a suit against the friends
or relatives of a debtor, a father, son, or brother, by means of
false evidence; by exaggerating words of recommendation, encouragement to forbearance, and requests for indulgence, into
positive contracts."8
But why was a suit upon a false promise to answer for the "debt,
default or miscarriage of another" especially menacing to the
defendant? Practically the only suggestion of the real reason
that the writer has seen is found in the following quotation from
Professor Williston:
"It is of assistance in the construction of the next provision
of the statute to have in mind the probable purpose of the legislature in providing that such promises to answer for the debt
of another must be in writing. Why should such promises, more
than others, be subject to that requirement? Doubtless because
the promisor has received no benefit from the transaction. This
circumstance may make perjury more likely, because while in
the case of one who has received something the circumstances
themselves which are capable of proof show probable liability,
in the case of a guaranty nothing but the promise is of evidentiary
valute. Moreover, as the lack of any benefit received by the
guarantor increases the hardship of his being called upon to pay,
it also increases the importance of being very sure that he is
7

See 6 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 388.

8

Per Shaw, C. J., in Nelson v. Boynton, (1841) 3 Metc. (Mass.)
396, 399. See also Davis v. Patrick, (1891) 141 U. S. 479, 487, 12 Sup.
Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826.
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justly charged. If these are the reasons for this clause of the
statute it is not a mere technicality to require as the fundamental
element in a valid oral promise to discharge another's liability
the receipt by the promisor of a quid pro quo, or beneficial consideration; and whatever conflict-there may be in the decisions,
it is at least true that without consideration of this kind, such a
promise is unenforceable." 9
If C alleges a sale of goods upon credit to P in reliance upon "
the promise of S that he will pay for them if P does not, or,
if he alleges that P owed him and he forbore to sue him or attach
his property because S promised to pay the debt, when S in fact
made no such promise, it is necessary for him to prove but one
important fact by false testimony to win his case. Either delivery
of the goods to P or forbearance to sue him or attach his property
would be ample consideration for the promise alleged and some
one of these facts had always occurred. Because of this, it was
unnecessary for the creditor to use false testimony to prove the
consideration alleged. But such facts -have no special tendency
to suggest that S induced their occurrence. The goods may have
been sold to P because C had full confidence that he would pay
or. he may have refrained from suing P because he believed he
would pay if given time or because he believed a.suit would be
a waste of time and money. Yet, it was always possible that
the facts' alleged could have been caused by the promise alleged.
There is some plausibility to C's claim because such promises
as he alleges are sometimes made to accommodate debtors and
to 'secure for them just such consideration as C alleges that P
received. If the making of the alleged promise is proved, the
inference that C gave the consideration alleged in reliance upon
it would be almost necessary. But it will be noted that the promise
alleged must be inferred solely from the testimony of such wit"nesses as the parties produce. The special danger, therefore, in
the type of situation contemplated by the statute, was due to the
fact that the consideration usually alleged in support of a false
promise had always occurred and, whether induced by a liomise
of thedefendant or-not, it was always consistent-with the plaintiff's claim that it was and it would.be inferred-that it was, if the
defendant's promise was proved. Since it was only necessary for
'the plaintiff to prove the making of the promise by_ false testimony and the defendant could not know in -advance when or
-91

Williston, Contracts, sec. 452. (W.riter'szitalics.)
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wheie- the -plaintiff's -witnesses would "testify that he made the
promise, it is clear that -the plaintiff had a decided advantage and
not- surprising that an unscrupulous creditor was able, to, produce
false testimony- that would convince -x jury that the -defendant
h~d promised as alleged. 10
I . Inasmuch as-it is generally agreed that-the legislature -had' no
purpose in enacting this provision other than the protection-of
defendants from :-being compelled to pay damages'-for breach of
promises never made, it- is reasonable, in construing it, to assume
that it was intended to desc'ribe and include- only those -situati6ns
presenting the special danger pointed out. This is-true- wiere
the plaintiff makes the defendant appear to promise solely -fdr
another's benefit, but where circumstances leading up to -or
accompanying the making of the promise, are- alleged that -re
not particularly susceptible to proof by perjury and such -circin-stances- indicate that the defendant's interest was'promoted i-l'thle
pas-age of the consideration alleged, the special danger that -the
plaintiff may prove a false pr6mise by perjury disappears because
the basis of the inference that the defendant promised is -broadened and is not confined to the testimony of witnesses that they
heard him promise. Whenever this is true, -the statute should
be inapplicable. But a disposition to ex)rnine its words in somewhat microscopic fashion and -attribute to them technical meaning
has at times resulted in its misapplication ard this'is believed .to
be chiefly responsible for -the suggestion that it promotes more
fraud than it prevents. Most of this" would- have been avoided if
it had always been borne in mind that its, language was used for
the purpose of describing in necessarily short and concise fashion
a situation where written evidence appeared to be necessary to
protect the defendant from the aforementioned danger of having
to pay damages for breach of a promise that he did .not make
That-it-has-been 'so generally adopted;--and-nowhere repealed;-is
believed to be due to the fact that the courts, on one ground or
another, have generally confined its operatioh to cases "presenting
the special danger 'pointed out. This will appear from the following discussion of some of the established principles governing
its application.
The promisee must be a creditoror obligee of a third person. One
of the requirements for the applicability of the statute among the
' 0Theowriter of the most recent attack upon the*statute, like'most
of its other, critics, seems to have been unaware of the -existence of this

special danger in this type of promise. Willis, The Statute -of 'Fiiuds'
A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L. J. 427.
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earliest to become well settled was that the promise must be made
to a creditor or obligee of some third person.1 ' Its language is
broad enough to include a promise to anyone to pay the debt of
"another person" than the promisor. But, to have held a promise
to anyone other than a creditor to be within the statute would
have brought within its operation situations presenting none of
the dangers at which it was aimed.' 2 The unscrupulous creditor
was not falsely claiming and proving by perjury that the defendant
promised the debtor to pay him. lEven if the creditor could have
sued on such a promise, the debtor, without temptation to swear
falsely, would have been a competent witness and his testimony
would have been conclusive. But, if he were dishonest also, it
would still be necessary to show a consideration for the promise.
Since it would be unnatural for the defendant to make such a
promise unless he received a benefit, the consideration alleged
would almost necessarily consist of a benefit conferred upon. the
promisor and this is not particularly susceptible to proof by perjury.' 3 The strongest reason, however, for the view that such
a promise is not within the statute is that the~creditor could have
maintained no action at law upon it. His only recourse would
have been a suit in equity." These obstacles to success make it
clear that no dishonest creditor would have thought of fabricating
a promise to anyone except himself. The courts accordingly have
held promises not made to creditors to be without the statute
because they could never have given rise to the danger from
perjury at which it was aimed.
A third person must owe an obligation that will be satisfied by
the proni~sor's performance. It has generally been held that a
promise conditioned upon nonperformance of an act by a third
person or a promise to pay a third person's debt cannot be within
the statute if the third person owes the promisee no duty. 5 The
"Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., 238.
"2Tomlinson v. Gill, (1756) Ambler, 330; Eastwood v. Kenyon,
(1840) 11 Ad. & Ed. 438, 3 Per. & Day. 276, 9 L. J. Q. B. 409, 4 Jur.
1081. 3 See 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 460.
1 1n Tomlinson v. Gill, (1756) Ambler 330, Lord Hardwick said:
"The modern determinations have made a distinction between a promise to pay the original debt, on the foot of the original contract, and
where it is on a new consideration." This language indicates that, at
this early date, it was understood that the danger contemplated by the
statute could not exist where it was necessary to prove a consideration that could not as plausibly be attributed to some inducement other
than the promise alleged.
"Tomlinson v. Gill, (1756) Ambler 330.
'-1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 454; Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th
ed., sec. 156.
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cases where this rule is applied fall into three general categories.
In the first, the third person has made no promise and there is
no other reason to believe that he owes a duty. For example, the
defendant selected and received articles for the funeral of Mrs.
Bradley, saying: "Charge them to the estate of Dr. Bradley and
as soon as his nephew comes to town he will pay for them, or
I will." Here the defendant received the articles herself and
made no profession of authority to charge the account of anyone
else. The passage of the consideration could not have been due
to reliance upon any other person's promise; it points to the
defendant alone as the person who induced it and was correctly
held to be without the statute. 6 Again, a promise to get M to
sign a specified guaranty that P would pay freight, when M has
made no promise, has been held to be without the statute.' 7 But,
a promise to sign a guaranty is held to be within the statute"8'
and a promise to get another to sign would seem to be within it
also ;" particularly where, as in the case referred to, the consideration alleged was the plaintiff's allowing his vessel that was
chartered to P to sail, an event without suggestion that the defendant induced its occurrence, since it did not appear that he
was interested in the ship's sailing. P did owe a duty to pay
freight and the defendant's promise, being in substance a conditional guaranty that P would pay, was really within the statute
but the defendant was correctly held liable because his promise
was written. The decision, however, could not be put on this
ground because it has been erroneously held that the statute
required the writing to express the promise and the consideration
as well.20 On the same ground, an oral promise to repay plaintiff
16Mease v. Wagner, (1821) 1 McCord (S.C.) 395. See also Lake-

man v. Mountstephen, (1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 17.
17Bushell v. Beavan, (1834) 1 Bingham, N. C. 103.
1SHayes v. Burkham, (1875) 51 Ind. 130.
' 0 See the criticism of Bushell v. Beavan in Carville v. Crane,
(1843)
S Hill (N.Y.) 483, 485.
2
OWain v. Warlters, (1804) 5 East. 10, 1 Smith K. B. 299. Since
it was the promise and not the consideration that was being proved
by perjury, when the statute was passed, it could hardly have been
intended to require that the writing express the consideration. If the
defendant actually promises, as it is known that he did when his promise is written, it is generally safe to infer that his promise in some
measure induced the plaintiff; it is not necessary that it be the sole
inducement. The view here criticized is based on the assumption that
"agreement" is used in the technical sense which includes both promise and consideration. In Ex parte Gardom, (1808) 15 Ves. 26, 287,
Lord Eldon said: "Until the case of Wain v. Warlters was cited some
time ago, I had always taken the law to be clear, that, if a man agreed

722
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the pii'e paid for stock, -incase- it' should become worthless, was
not within the statute because no- one else would owe the plaintiff
such a duty. 21 The~stock might become worthless as a result of
wilful- mismanagement but the -same could occur without breach
of dut by- anyone. -While the purpose of such a promise is to
protect the -plaintiff -from, loss, it is not' limited to or 'mainly
directed to loss resulting from another's breach 'of duty. But; it
appeared 'that-'the defendant was. an officer- directing the -,affairs
of the' c6rporation, that it was in serious need of funds and that
the plaintiff had previously declined, an offer by the defendant
to- secure him by a-second mortgage upon the corporate property
if lie would purchase the stock. 'These facts make -almost neces*'
sary-the inferenice that.the plaintiff's subsequent purchase of.stock
in an embarrassed corporati6n was due to some inducement from
the defendant.
In the second-class,' a promise has been made by a third'person
t6 whonr the consideration moved but the obligation' contemplated
does -'not cbnme into existence, because of some ifid-apadty, For
exam le, -a guaranty: that a married woman will perform her
contract ig within 'the statute, rictWithstdnding the fact- that
married women's- contracts at cnrnon.'law were :Void;2 The
in' Writing to pay'the debt* of another, it was not" necessary that the
consideration should-.appear upon the face of the writing." In 1856, the
doctrine. of Wain v. Warlters -was abolished by statute. 19 & 20 Victoriae,
chap. 97,'sec. 3. *
";-2 1Kilbride v. M6ss, (1896y-'113' Cal. 432, 451 Pac. 812, 54 Am. St.
Rep..361; Moorehouse-v..Crangle, (1880) 36 Oh. St. 130, 38 Am. Rep.
564. But in a similar case the supreme court of Missouri reached the
opposite conclusion, saying: "The Word 'miscarriage7 ias clearly in:
tended to-.have a broader meaning: than either 'debt" or 'default',- and
jn
yhrdpary,
should be-so construedas tinclude the failure. bya t
this case the William A. Orr Shoe. Company, to succeed in the proposed, business, regardless of the fact whether its failure to do so.
would entitle the plaintiff. tb an.action at. law or not.
"The requirement th'atan'actionable duty shall exist was made first
by the court in cases.of 'debt-because, unless there was a.'debt'. owing by the third' part;,"'that parf of the statute clearly, did not apply.
The same requirement was later extended to 'default,' meaning 'default in any duty,' 'and for the same reason. But the reason does iot
exist in case of miscdrriage,' i.e., the act of a third party, whether
a'ctionable or not; and the requirement should not be made.
"In other words, if any meaning or force at all is to be given to
the word "miscarriage,' -it' must mean something different from or
broader- than 'debt" or "default',- 'and this is the only distinction that
can,2 2
Gansey v. Orr, (1903) 173 Mo. 532, 545, 73 S. W. 477.
Maggs v:'Am~s, (192 8) 1 Moo. & P. 294, 4- Bin'g. 470; 6 L. 3. Q.
S. C. P. 75; Miller v. Long, (1863) 45 Pa. St. 350. There are dicta
contra in Andersbn v.. Spence, (1880) 72 Ind. 315, 321, and King v.
Summii, (1881) .73 jnd. 312, 38 Am. Rep. 145. Some Writers assert
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same view obtains as to a guaranty of an infant's contract, where
it is frequently said that the contract is voidable and the infant
bound until he disaffirms..2 3 That a married woman was privileged
not to perform her promise is obvious. For this reason, it seems
improper to say that she owes a debt or is guilty of a default
in not performing. The same may be said of an infant. Failure
to perform a promise where performance is expected by a
promisee, who has given consideration for it, may be termed
"miscarriage" and guaranties of such contracts should be held to
be within the statute because they present the precise danger at
which it was aimed. In such cases, only the making of the
promise need be proved by false testimony. The married woman
or infant has received the consideration in return for an actual
promise of which the promisee expects performance. The fact
that the creditor had no right to the expected performance would
make the temptation to fabricate a promise by another perhaps
stronger than in the ordinary guaranty where the creditor at least
had a right to performance. 24 Such cases are clearly within the
intent of the statute.
In the last class of cases, a third person once owed a debt
which the plaintiff alleges he discharged in reliance upon the
defendant's promise to pay it. Such a promise is generally agreed
to be without the statute.2" The reason usually given is that there
that the oral guaranty is valid if the third person's contract is "void,"
as distinguished from "voidable." 1 Williston, Contracts, see. 454;
Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., sec. 156; Arnold, Suretyship and
Guaranty,
sec. 53.
23
Dexter v. Blanchard, (1865) 11 Allen (Mass.) 365;" Clark' v.
Levy, 10 N. Y. Legal Obs. 184; Brown v. Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank, (1895) 88 Tex. 265, 31 S. W. 285, 33 L. R. A. 359. Contra, See
Harris v. Huntback, (1757) 1 Burr. 373, 2 Keny. 28; Chapin v. Lapham, (138) 20 Pick. (Mass.) 467; King v. Summit, (1881) 73 Ind. 312,
38 Am. Rep. 145; Roche v. Chaplin, (1830) 1 Bailey (S.C.) 419.
24
The general view seems to be that an agent's oral guaranty of
a corporation's ultra vires contract is binding. 1 Williston, Contracts,
sec. 454. His promise is said to be "original" under sudh circumstances. See Drake v. Llewellen, (1858) 33 Ala. 106; Kilbride v. Moss,
(1896) 113 Cal. 432, 45 Pac. 812; Coris v. Star City Bldg. Ass'n, (1898) 20
Ind. App. 630, 50 N. E. 779. Though the court in the foregoing cases
said that the statute was inapplicable because no third person was
bound, there was a better reason in each for so holding. See Harker
v. Russell, (1886) 67 Wis. 257, 30 N. W. 358.
2
Bird v. Gammon, (1837) 3 Bing. N. C., 883; 3 Hodg. .224, 5 Scott
213, 6 L. J. C. P. 883; Hill v. Grat, -(1923) 247 Mass. 25, 141 N. E.
593: Smith v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., (1922) 112 Kan.
201, 210 Pac. 477. Whether the third person is released or not is a
question of fact. Slotnick v. Smith, (1925) 252 Mass. 579, 147 N. E.
737.
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is no debt of a third person. The conclusion is undoubtedly
correct because the dangers at which the statute was aimed are
absent. The discharge of the debt is sufficient consideration for
the defendant's promise and, while a creditor could in his records
create an appearance of having discharged the debtor, his claim
that it was done in reliance upon a promise of the defendant could
not be proved to the ordinary mind without showing some reason
for the defendant's assuming the debt. In such cases, it is generally alleged that the defendant received some consideration from
the debtor or is indebted to him. If the defendant received consideration from the debtor, the chances are that he promised as
alleged but a false allegation of such consideration could hardly
be proved by perjury because the debtor could testify whether
and why he gave it. If it were claimed that the defendant, being
indebted to the plaintiff's debtor, promised to pay in consideration
of his discharge, no jury would believe the plaintiff's claim, unless
he showed that it had been agreed that the defendant's performance to the plaintiff would satisfy his own obligation to the debtor.
The reliable testimony of the latter would always show whether
this was true.
The promise must be to pay out of the promisor's ornt substance.
It has nearly always been held that a promise is not within the
statute unless the promisor undertakes to pay out of his own
substance.2 6 Frequently a defendant in possession of property
belonging to a third person, or indebted to him, is alleged to have
promised to pay the plaintiff's claim against the third person
from the proceeds of such property or from such indebtedness.
Such a promise is within the letter of the statute but also without
its intent because of the absence of the danger at which it was
aimed. There was no particular temptation to fabricate such a
promise because it would rarely increase the creditor's probability
of collecion, inasmuch as it only made available to him property
or claims belonging to the debtor. These he could usually reach
by attachment, execution or garnishment anyhow. But, it would
always be necessary to show consideration for such a promise.
This might consist of forbearance to attach or levy upon the
LnPlatt v. Foster, (1913) 7 Ala. App. 402, 62 So. 299; Hall v.
Lincoln Say. & Tr. Co., (1908) 220 Pac. 485, 69 Atl. 994; Browne,
Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., secs. 177, 178, 186, 187. 1 Williston Contracts, secs. 455-456. But see Scott v. Thomas, (1832) 1 Scam. (Ill.)
58;. Campbell v. Weston Basket & Barrel Co., (1915) 87 Wash. 73,
151 Pac. 103.
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debtor's property and, if an intent to attach or levy were shown
to have been abandoned, this fact would have a special tendency
to suggest that the plaintiff was induced to abandon it by the
defendant, because he was in possession of the property and normally more immediately interested in his possession not being
disturbed than anyone else. If the consideration alleged was
merely the duty resulting from the arrangement between the
debtor and the defendant, it could not be proved contrary to fact
because the debtor was always a competent witness. Furthermore, such a promise could not subject the defendant to such
danger of ultimate loss as would a promise of the sort contemplated by the statute, where the plaintiff usually claimed that
the defendant promised to pay when it was certain that the debtor
would not pay. In such a case, the defendant would rarely be
able to get reimbursement from the worthless debtor, if he were
entitled to it. But, if the defendant is made to pay damages for
breach of a spurious promise to pay out of the debtor's property
the value of the property would measure the maximum recovery
and his possession would secure reimbursement in most cases.
The promise inzst be such that its performance will satisfy a
third person's obligation. Another well settled rule is that a
promise is not within the statute unless its performance will
satisfy a third person's obligation.2 7 For example, S, indebted
or about to become indebted to P, is alleged to have promised C
to notify him when the time arrives to pay P so that C could
garnishee him or in some other way collect from P before he
made away with the money. The statute is inapplicable to such
a promise. 28 There would be little temptation to fabricate it
inasmuch as garnishment would generally produce the result
desired. But such a promise requires consideration and, if the
consideration alleged was a benefit moving from the plaintiff to
the defendant, it could hardly be proved contrary to fact and,
when proved, would itself suggest that it was induced by the
defendant. If the consideration alleged moved to a third person,
the danger contemplated by the statute would not exist, if the
plaintiff alleged circumstances preceding or accompanying the
promise not susceptible to proof by perjury and specially indicative of a promise by the defendant. In the case above, the
plaintiff alleged that he had furnished material to N to build a
271 Williston, Contracts, sec. 455.
28
Towne v. Grover, (1830) 9 Pick. (Mass.) 306.
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house for the defendant, that he refused to furnish more because
N had not paid and that he subsequently furnished the rest of the
necessary materials.
A promise is not within the statute if the promisor becomes a
debtor. At one time the action of debt would not lie unless the
promisor received the consideration from the promisee but for
more than two hundred years it has been settled that any consideration that would make one a debtor if he received it himself
2
will make him a debtor if another receives it at his request.
So the oral promise of S to pay for goods delivered to P at his
request is valid, because S alone is obligated.30 The statute is
likewise inapplicable where, for a single consideration, P and S
promise in the same terms. For example, S orally promises to
sign a note with P- for a horse to be delivered to P, if P likes
the horse when he 'sees him. Delivery of the horse makes a
debtor of S as well as-P.3 ' In a certain sense, the promise of S
is a promise to pay P's debt. His payment will extinguish P's
obligation as well as his own, but, as -far as C is concerned, S is
as much his debtor as is P"3and his -promise to C is no more a
promise to pay P's debt than his own. Where this is the conse29

Ames, Lectures on Legal History 93..

30

Vicksburg Infirmary v. Hines, (1913) 134 Miss. 162, 98 So. 530.
322 Gibbs v. Blanchard, (1867) 15 Mich. 292.
1n fact, it is.generally assumed that there: is only one debt.
"One quid .pro quo can never give rise to two debts." Ames, Lectures
on Legal History 94. "This seems generally assumed in the cases."
1 Williston, Contracts, see. 466,- n. 97. Nevertheless it seems doubtful whether this assumption was ever justified. "How can two persons "be liable 'as original principal debtors, under a parol contract,
not in writing, for the entirety of the same debt? To state the
proposition seems its best refutation.. If the liability of the one is
complete by itself, and not dependent upon or collateral to the other,
then payment by one would not be payment for both, and the fortunate possessor of such an undertaking might enforce double satisfaction for the same debt. If the undertakings be not independent,
one must be collateral to the other, and that which is thus collateral
must be subject. to the operation of the statute." Whelply, J., in
Hetfield v. Dow, (1859) 27 N. J.L. 440; 451. If this argument were
sound, P and S could not -be oiiginal debtors where they jointly and
severally promise C- in writing;, payment by one could not be a payment for both and "double satisfaction for the same debt" might be
enforced in such a case' also. -Yet, it'is well settled thit-P and S
could be sued separately in debt and payment -by either operates as
a condition subsequent to the other's duty, because so intended. It
makes no difference who received the consideration or whether the
promises were oral or Written in the form -of a specialty that may
1

have been conceived of as giving rise to the "debt." The
varying and indispensable element essential to the existence
is the - fisage of a quid pr6 quo -from the promisee and
of the promise or promises by which it-is induced appears

only unof a debt
the form
to be the
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quence of the- transaction,- the statute is -inapplicable33 but this
result cannot follow, where S promises to pay, if P does not. Such
a'promise would not make S a debtor according'to popular usage
nor would debt or indebitatus assumpsit lie upon it 'at common
law.34 It has-been suggested-that, where-the consideration moved
to a third person, the statute was intended to include- the promise
only when its terms were such that neither, debt nor iridebitatus
assumpsit would lie.3 5 This-is doubtless-correct. It seems to be
justified by its language as well-as the fact that only such promises
could 'be, fabricated with any hope 'of success. Whether-promises
to pay if another does not and promises to pay ai6ther's debt
already due are necessarily within the statute will be discussed
presently but it is generally agreed that a promise is never within
the statute- if the promisor is a debtor.
A promise is not within the statute if the promisor's main
purpose is to sibserve some purpose of his ow. From the foregoing discussion, it seems to be clear that the danger contemplated
by the statute existed only where a third-person received 'all of
the consideration and the promise alleged-was 'all tlat the plaintiff
had to prove by false testimony. When parties were disqualified
as witnesses, it has been' 'seen that the unscrupufdis plaintiff had
a decided advantage. It is still possible that' the false testim ony
of the plaintiff and a dishonest clerk nay bbiliev'd 'by the juiy
when the defendant alone testifies to -the ontrarybiut'tle retnoval
of the disqualification of partiesas ' veises has undobtedly
greatly decreased the danger from perjury ii .11 'kinds of litigation. Because of this, courtsmay consider the statute less necessary now and may appear to hae restricted "its operaition' smeonly factor of importance in determining who the debtor is 6r whether
there is more than one. See Bennington' LuNb'er Co.' v: Aitaway,

(1916)33 58 Okla. 229, 158-Pac. 566.
.
Whether the promise of S is within the statute is, sometimes

said to depend-upon whose credit the promisee relied upon. Browne.
Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., sec. 197. "If the whole credit'be not given
to the person who comes in to answer for another, his ,undertaking
is collateral and must be in writing." 3 Kent, Commentaries, 323.
This statement is misleading and erroneous Where the 'promises of
P and S are in the same terms, as where they jointly or jointly and
severally promise. Even though C believed that P would pay, the
consideration moves-in reliance upon both promises and 'each promisor
becomes a debtor.- The danger from perjury is absent in such 'a case
because S could hardly make such a promise without P's knowledge

and 34he would be a competent witness.
Rozer v. Rozer, (1691)

2 Ventris- 36; Jones v. Cooper, (1774)

1 Cowper 227, Lofft 769...
351 Williston, Contracts, sec. 463.
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what but it is the writer's belief that few cases now held to be
without the statute would at any time have presented the special
danger that prompted its" enactment. In order to proscribe an
evil believed to be inherent in a situation and prescribe change
that would remove it, the situation had to be described. Since it
was a special danger to the defendant that caused the enactment
of the statute, it may be assumed that it was intended to apply
only where this danger existed. But the simple and concise
language used to describe this situation, if literally interpreted,
would include many situations where the danger contemplated
could not exist and its application to such cages could only promote injustice. Fortunately, however, the courts generally have
not so dealt with it. On one ground or another they have held
to be without its scope cases where a dishonest plaintiff would
have little or no chance to succeed by the use of false testimony.
Importance of the consideration alleged. It must not be forgotten that the dishonest plaintiff at whom this provision was
aimed succeeded because he always alleged a promise of such
tenor that it was unnecessary for him to prove a separate and
distinct consideration for it. Only because of this was there sufficient hope of success to tempt him to begin a suit. It must have
been the general appreciation of this that led Lord Hardwick,
in 1756, to say that "the modern determinations have made a
distinction between a promise to pay the original debt, on the
foot of the original contract, and where it is on a new consideration."3'8 If the new consideration alleged consisted of a benefit
conferred upon the promisor, there would be no more danger
from perjury than in an action upon any other promise. The fact
that the promise sued upon related to another person's debt or
obligation would make no difference, as far as the danger from
perjury is concerned. But, it is otherwise if the new consideration alleged consists of mere detriment to the promisee and a
third person, already indebted to the promisee, receives all the
corresponding benefit, as where the plaintiff alleges that he forebore to sue P in reliance upon the defendant's promise to pay
the debt. Such forbearance is ample as consideration but it alone
provides no protection against perjury in an action upon a false
promise because it has actually taken place but could as well have
been due to inducement by P; its occurrence is not suggestive of
inducement by the defendant.
36Tomlinson v. Gill, (1756) Ambler, 330.
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It must always be borne in mind that the purpose of examining the consideration alleged is to determine whether it removes
the danger from perjury. This depends, first, upon the susceptibility of the fact alleged to proof by perjury and, second, upon
its tendency, when proved, to indicate a promise by the defendant.
If the fact alleged as consideration is such that it benefits the
defendant alone, or more immediately than anyone else, its
occurrence can seldom be proved contrary to fact and the natural
inference is that it was probably induced by the person solely or
immediately benefited.
Other facts that remove the danger of perjury. But, even
where the consideration alleged does not solely, immediately or
especially benefit the defendant, other circumstances unsusceptible to proof by false testimony may almost as strongly indicate
that the defendant's promise induced the occurrence of the fact
alleged as consideration. Such circumstances often forbid the
inference that the consideration, principally or immediately beneficial to a third person, moved in reliance upon his promise alone.
They nearly always indicate that the protection or promotion of
some interest of the defendant required the consideration alleged
and suggest, if they do not clearly show, that the plaintiff would
not have given it but for some inducement from the defendant;
they negative the inference that the defendant promised simply
to accommodate some one else. Since promises generally are made
to promote the promisor's own interest or desire, the plausibility
of the plaintiff's claim is greatly enhanced when he alleges facts
preceding or accompanying the alleged promise that show this to
have been the defendant's purpose.
For example, the plaintiff alleged that he was called to treat
the defendant's adult son, who owed an old bill; that he found
him suffering from pneumonia but informed the defendant that
he would not treat him unless defendant agreed to pay him for
this service, as well as the old bill; that the defendant so promised
37
and he treated the son. This promise was not within the statute.
It will be noted that the services here were rendered to the son.
They could have been rendered in return for a promise to pay
by either the son or the father, or both, or for the father's promise
to pay, if the son did not. But the allegation that the plaintiff
told the defendant that he would not treat his son is material and
would have to be proved before it would be believed that his
3t

Evans v. Shaw, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 268 S. W. 1037.
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-subsequent rendition of services was in reliance upon the promise
alleged. While the treatment of the son on the occasion would
normally be on the basis of a promise to pay for that treatment,
it is ample consideration for a promise to pay any other amount,
if so intended. The fact that the son owed an old debt was itself
corroborative of the plaintiff's claim that he refused to treat him
unless the defendant promised to pay the old bill as well as the
new. The plaintiff's refusal, being known to the defendant,
.enders it probable that he offered whatever inducement was
necessary to obtain the treatment his son needed. The court said
that the son was not liable for the services rendered him on this
occasion. As to the promise to pay the old bill, apparently a
promise to pay the debt of another and within the statute, the
court, holding otherwise, quoted as applicable the following rule:
"Wherever the main purpose and object of the promisor is,
rot to answer- for another, but to subserve some purpose of his
own, his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in
-form 'a promise 'to pay the debt of another, and although the
performance of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing the liability of another."
It then said:
"The son was in a helpless condition, unable on his own responsibility to secure treatment by the appellee. There was a
moral obligation and duty on the part of the appellant to secure
such treatment, aid no doubt appellant felt very keenly this moral
obligation on his part, and so, for the purpose, not primarily, of
paying or securing his son's-debt, but to subserve a purpose of
his own-the performance of this moral obligation to his son-he
agreed unconditionally to pay, not only for future treatments,
but also the old bill of $102."
The court considered the promise alleged to have been satisfactorily prpved by the evidence and, in determining the applicability
of the statute, emphasized the defendant's purpose in making the
promise. But the legislature had no concern as to why promises
to answer for the debts or defaults of others were made. Its
only concern was to provide a reasonable guaranty that defendants
were not made to pay damages for breach of such promises unless
they made them. In the foregoing case, the court reached the
correct result as to the applicability of the statute by what many
.would regard as an erroneous application pf the general rule by
which the 'court justified its conclusion. It is unfortunate that
the court did not say that the promise to pay the debt was not
within the statute because the facts alleged by the plaintiff were
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specially indicative of a promise by the defendant and not
susceptible to proof by perjury.
A typical and leading case, illustrative of the general rule
relied upon in the foregoing case is Davis v. Patrick.a8 In this
case, Davis had advanced £5,000 to the Flagstaff Mining Company and it had sold and agreed to deliver to him 5,195 tons of
ore. This ore was paid for in advance and Davis agreed to
advance additional money if needed. The written agreement
between Davis and The Company, setting forth the foregoing
arrangement, also provided that the mine should be put under the
sole management of Patrick to be worked and controlled by him
until the ore sold had been delivered and all money borrowed
repaid with interest. It also gave Patrick a full power of attorney
and provided that his control was irrevocable save at the instance
of Davis. Patrick took control of the mine and subsequently,
more than once, complained to Davis that he was not being paid.
On each occasion, Davis told him to transport the ore and he
would see that he was paid. The Company having failed to pay
him, Patrick sued Davis to recover the amount due him for his
services. The court said that, if it were not for the statute of
frauds, "there would be no question, for obviously there was both
promise and consideration." It pointed out that the Company
was indebted to Patrick for his services but that his services had
enured to the benefit of Davis as well as the Company. The
Company had no property other than the mine and was embarrassed financially. The undisputed facts showed that Davis'
interest required Patrick's continued operation of the mine because
its entire output belonged to him until he was paid. The Company's embarrassed condition made plausible Patrick's claim that
he had intended to leave its service. Moreover, Davis had control, as long as he was unpaid, of Patrick's operation of the mine.
The inferences to be drawn from these various facts were
corroborative of the testimony of the witness and clearly justified
the statement of the court that "obviously there was both promise
and consideration." There was no danger whatever of the sort
contemplated by the statute, where the inference that the
defendant promised had to be drawn solely from the testimony
of witnesses and received no support from the "relations of the
parties" or other circumstances. The court said:
38(1891) 141 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826.
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"The thought is, that there is a marked difference between a
promise which, without any interest in the subject-matter of the
promise in the promisor, is purely collateral to the obligation of
a third party, and that which, though operating upon the debt of
a third party, is also and mainly for the benefit of the promisor.
The case before us is in the latter category. . . . In such cases
the reason which underlies and which prompted this statutory
provision fails, and the courts will give effect to the promise."
While professing to recognize the distinction between original and
collateral promises, the court pointed out that "the real character
of a promise does not depend altogether upon the form of the
expression but largely upon the situation of the parties." The
conclusion that the statute was inapplicable is sound but it is
unfortunate that the court emphasized the purpose of the defendant's promise without suggesting that the circumstances indicative
of this purpose were also suggestive of a promise by the defendant
and unsusceptible to proof by perjury and, because of this,
removed the danger contemplated by the statute.
Four other types of cases, not within the statute for the foregoing reason but frequently dealt with as if they were controlled
40
by special considerations, remain to be considered.
The "PropertyCases." The distinguishing characteristic of these
cases is that either property belonging to the promisor or property
that he wishes to acquire is subject to a lien or mortgage to secure
the debt of a third person. A promise to pay the debt in consideration of the discharge of the lien or mortgage is generally
held to be without the statute.4' The leading case is Williams v.
Leper.42 In that case, Taylor had conveyed all his effects for the
benefit of his creditors to the defendant, who was in possession
and about to sell, when the plaintiff distrained for rent. The
plaintiff alleged that, in consideration of his leaving the defendant's possession undisturbed, the defendant promised to pay the
rent and this promise was without the statute. Neither the change
of possession normally involved in the surrender of a lien upon
personalty to the defendant nor the acts incident to the discharge
of a lien or mortgage upon his realty is particularly susceptible
39
In the various other cases where the same rule has been applied, it was unnecessary to infer that the defendant promised solely
from testimony that he promised.
40See Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin [1902] 1 K. B.
778, 71 L. J. K. B. 529, 86 L. T. 505, 50 W. R. 449, 18 T. L. R. 428,
46 Sol.
Jo. 357.
41
Williston, Contracts, sec. 472.
42(1766) 3 Burrow 1886.
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to proof by perjury. Such acts, being a direct benefit to the
defendant, suggest that they were induced by him. In the ordinary case, there would be little reason to suppose that the inducement could have come from anyone else. The danger contemplated by the statute existing only where the consideration alleged
might as easily be attributed to inducement from the principal
debtor or someone else as from the defendant, promises supported
by a consideration specially benefitting the defendant are without
its intent. But, where the plaintiff had a lien for repairs upon
a boat belonging to a third person, the defendant's promise to
pay the debt in consideration of the surrender of the boat to the
owner was within the statute.4 3 Proof that the defendant
promised depended solely on oral testimony. Delivery of the boat
to the owner did not appear to promote any interest of the plaintiff and afforded no basis for an inference that the defendant
induced it. If, however, it had been surrendered to the defendant,
the resulting advantage would argue some inducement by him.
Another type of case is almost equally clear. P contracted to
build a house for the defendant and the plaintiff furnished P
material but he alleges that, having refused to furnish more,
because of P's failure to pay, and having threatened to put a
lien upon the property, the defendant promised to pay the past
and future indebtedness of P, if he would furnish P further
materials and not put a lien on his property. 44 Under ordinary
circumstances the furnishing of materials to P, as well as failure
to put a lien on the property, might be attributed to a belief that
P would pay. The special circumstances alleged, however, that
must be proved in order to establish a consideration for the
promise alleged are not susceptible to proof by perjury. P's
arrears, the plaintiff's refusal to supply further materials and
his threat to put a lien on the property clearly negative the inference that further materials were furnished P on his credit alone.
The defendant's knowledge of the foregoing facts, the furnishing
of further materials and forbearance to put the lien on together
suggest that the defendant probably promised to pay the past and
future indebtedness of P. His lsomise is frequently said to be
without the statute because his main purpose is the promotion of
43Mallory v. Gillett, (1860) 21 N. Y. 412.
44Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1919) 258 Fed.

169; Voska, et al. v. Ruland, (1916) 172 App. Div. 616, 158 N. Y. S.
780. Compare Raabe v. Squier, (1895) 148 N. Y. 81, 42 N. E. 516.
See (1916) 2 Corn. L. Quart. 209.
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-his own interest. The real reason appears to be that the special
circumstances that must be shown in order to prove consideration
are not susceptible to proof by perjury.
Another related class -of cases to which the statute is often
held to be applicable arises where an officer of a corporation is
alleged to have induced the plaintiff to extend credit to the corporation by guaranteeing that it would pay.45 Such extension of
credit is normally induced solely by the corporation's promise to
pay. Where, however, it appears that the plaintiff refused credit
to the corporation, it must be inferred that his subsequent extension of credit was induced by someone else. But, since the consideration finally benefits other officers and stockholders proportionately as much as it does the defendant, it alone does not
suggest that the defendant, rather than. some. other interested
party, induced its passage. But if, for example, the defehdant
was the majority stockholder and controlling the affairs of the
corporation and had unsuccessfully negotiated for credit for the
corporation, there is special reason to believe that he induced the
plaintiff to extend credit. 46 Circumstances so suggestive and riot
susceptible to proof by perjury are correctly held to take the case
without the statute.
The "Dacument Cases." 'Another type of case, sometimes referred to as the "document cases," is without the statute for the
same reason. The plaintiff alleges that he was induced to take
P's note in return for goods delivered to the defendant, or in
payment of his debt, by his oral guaranty that P would pay the
note. It is generally said that such a promise, though in form a
guaranty, is really a promise by the defendant to pay his own
47
debt.
In the vast majority of cases where paper is transferred the
transferor agrees to stand back of it. Because such agreement
is one of the ordinary inducements to accept a transfer of commercial paper, "itis reasonable to assume that the plaintiff was
45
Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin, [1902] 1 K. B. 778,
71 L. J. B. 529, 86 L. T. 505, 50 W. R. 449, 18 T. L. R. 428, 46 Sol.
P. 357; Hurst Hardware Co. v..¢.Goodman, (1910) 68 W. Va. 462, 69
S. E. 898, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 598.
But see Enterprise Trading Co.
v. Bank of Crowell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 296; Am. Wholesale Corp'n v. Mauldin, (1924) 128 S. C. 241, 122 S. E. 576.
"See Am. Wholesale Corp'n v. Mauldin (1924) 128 S. C. 241,
122 4S.
E. 576.
7
Hargreaves v. Parsons, (1844) 13 M. & W. 561, 14 L. J. Ex.
250, 4 L. T. 0. S. 213; Cardell v. McNeil, (1860) 21 N. Y. 336; Brown
v. Curtis, (1849) 2 N. Y. 225.
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induced by, it. At any rate, the alleged promisor, who has received
whatever consideration the plaintiff gave, is not made to appear
to accommodate the maker, who received no consideration from
the plaintiff. But it has been held that the reasoning applicable
to the foregoing case does not apply where the debtor prevails
upon the plaintiff, his creditor, to accept in payment of his debt
a note of P made directly to the plaintiff. In such a case, it is
said that there is no debt of anyone except the third person and
the promise of the defendant must be to pay a third person's
debt. This decision is illustrative of the error that results where
the words of the statute are construed without due reference
to the evil at which it was aimed.48 There is as much reason to
believe that the creditor would expect a supplemental promise in
such a case as where the note was owned by the defendant and
transferred to the creditor as conditional payment and there is
no reason to believe that the defendant would be less willing or
apt to make the supplementary promise in the one case than in
the other. Neither should be held to be within the statute because
9
neither ' presents the dangers contemplated by it.4
The del credere agent's pronise. A del credere agent receives
possession of goods from the owner for sale upon commission,
guaranteeing that all persons to whom he sells on credit will
promptly pay for the goods. Title remains in the owner and
he. bears the risk of loss as long as the agent takes reasonable
care of the goods. The agent usually sells the goods in his own
name but the purchaser becomes indebted to the owner as undisclosed principal. The agent may sue for the price or receive
payment, in which case he probaly holds the proceeds in trust
for the owner.50 The owner may sue for the purchase price after
the due date but, if the goods have been properly sold on credit,
he has no cause of action against the agent unless he fails to
receive payment in accordance with the purchaser's promise."
"Upon non-payrhxent by the vendor the debt falls absolutely on
48Dows v. Swett, (1883) 134 Mass. 140, 45 Am. Rep. 310. One
learned writer justified this decision on the ground that, the plaintiff being payee of the note, it was not transferred by the defendant.
Browne,
Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., sec. 165a.
49
Sheldon v. Butler, (1878) 24 Minn. 513; Crane v. Wheeler,
(1892) 48 Minn. 207, 50 N. W. 1033. Eagle, etc., Machine Co. v.
Shattuck, (1881) 53 Wis. 455, 10 N. W. 690, 40 Am. Rep. 780.
5OSee Cushman v. Snow, (1904) 186 Mass. 169, 71 N. E. 529.
"'See the general discussion of del credere commissions in 2
Mechem, Agency, sec. 2534.
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the factor." 52 Such being the nature of the del credere agent's
undertaking, it is clear that he does undertake to "answer for
•the debt or default of another person." His promise is made to
a prospective creditor and no one denies that the purchaser bedomes a debtor of the promisee or that the agent's performance
of his duty terminates his promisee's right against the purchaser.
Yet, no recent case has held that such a promise is within the
5 3

statute.

In justification of this general view, one distinguished writer
says:
"The case of the del credere bailiff or factor is merely a
particular species of accountability. The terms of any bailment
to account are provable by parol. The defence was always permissible in account before the auditors that although the goods
had been sold that the vendee's debt was uncollectible by the
bailiff; provided he had authority to sell on credit and had not
been negligent.
"A del credere factorship was merely one in which this usual
defense was by agreement denied to the bailee. The words, 'No
action shall be brought upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, etc., of another person' cannot properly apply to an
action to enforce an accounting for the reason that the action of
account is here brought on the bailment to account and there is
no action brought upon the guaranty. The guaranty is only one
of the terms of the defendant's accountability."54
Another has said that "the weight of authority in the United
States is undoubtedly in support of the rule that a factor who
sells by virtue of his employment, under a del credere commission is liable not collaterally merely, but absolutely as principal,
and that if the debt be not paid when due, indebitatus assumpsit
will lie against him at once for the amount."
52Wolff v. Koppel, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 458, 460.
5
3Wolff v. Koppel, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 458, 460; Bullowa v.
Orgo,
(1898) 57 N. J. Eq. 428, 41 Atl. 494.
54
Hening, A New and Old Reading on the Fourth Section of the
Statute of Frauds, 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 611, 632.
552 Mechem, Agency, sec. 2534.
"Instead of paying cash, the factor prefers to contract a debt or
duty which obligates him to see the money paid. This debt or duty
is his own, and arises from an adequate consideration. It is contingent, depending on the event of his failing to secure it through
-another-some future vendee, to whom the merchant is first to resort."
Cowen, J., in Wolff v. Koppel, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 458, 459.
The courts were clear that the promise was not within the stat.ute, but the generally accepted view that the purchaser from the
agent became a debtor of the principal and could be sued by him
presented a real obstacle. The only way to evade it was to hold that
the agent became a debtor. If his receipt of the goods had this consequence, his promise was not within the statute even though the
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To a much earlier writer the del credere agent's promise did
not seem to satisfy the language of the statute. "It does not
appear to be a promise to answer for the debt or default of any
particular person; for there was no debt in existence at the time
the contract was made. ....
There is no debtor or person proposing to become a debtor, to whom the term 'another person'
8
can apply."0
The reason most often given for the view that the del credere
agent's promise is not within the statute is that the guaranty is
merely incidental to his agency; the main object of his promise
is to fix the terms of his compensation rather than to answer for
the debt of another person. "The statute," it is said, "applies
only to a 'special' promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, that is, a promise specially directed
to this end. It does not apply to a promise made with some other
57
main or immediate object."
same transaction made of some other person a debtor also. Delivery
of the goods to the agent could make no one else a debtor because he
might never sell them. If it made the agent a debtor, the goods would
belong to him, his later sale would make the purchaser his debtor
and there would be no reason to permit the original owner to sue
the purchaser. Yet it is clear that the purchaser is liable to the original
owner and the factor is not, as long as he uses care to preserve the
goods, unless he sells them. These appear to be serious objections to
the theory that delivery to the agent makes him a debtor.
In Sherwood v. Stone (1856) 14 N. Y. 267, this ingenious, but apparently unsound, account for the existence of the debt is found: "A
guaranty by a factor differs very especially from a promise to pay the
debt of another in another particular; the principal transfers a right
(although not the exclusive right) to the factor to sue for and recover
the money in his own name, and to collect the debt and hold the
money,, accounting only for the net balance of the account between
the parties. Thus the debt of the purchaser is to some extent made
the property of the factor, and he to that extent becomes the purchaser of it, and so far substitutes his liability in place of that of
the purchaser. The effect of this generally is to make the factor
practically the owner of the debt, and this is almost invariably so,
if he remains solvent and on just terms with his principal. Then the
principal is unknown to the purchaser." The principal's transferring
a right to sue, when he delivers the goods, is beset with one obvious
difficulty. At this time, since there has not been and may never be
a sale of the goods, he has no such right or power himself, nor does
he have a power to create such in the agent. At most, the principal
could only promise to permit the agent to sue. But such a promise
would not be such a quid pro quo as would give rise to a debt. Moreover, if the principal should sue the subsequent purchaser, as he
clearly may, there would be a failure of consideration and the agent,
for this reason, would not be liable on his promise. But the law is
clearly
otherwise.
58
Throop, Validity of Verbal Agreements 660. The learned author
expressed the opinion that the statute would apply if the buyer was
named.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

What the principal object of such a guaranty is depends upon
the point of view. From the agent's point of view, it is to secure
additional compensation but the creditor's main object is to acquire
a security against loss. The fact that the guarantor has a purpose of his own scarcely justifies calling him a debtor or denying
that he promises to answer for the debt of another. Nevertheless,
the well established view that the promise of a del credere agent
is not within the statute is sound because it presents practically
no danger that spurious claims may be established by false testimony.
It has been seen that the danger contemplated by the statute
existed only where the third person's receipt of the consideration
alleged left the defendant's promise the only fact essential to
recovery that had to be established by perjury. That this was not
so in an action upon a del credere agent's promise is clear from
the foregoing analysis. The promisee parted with his goods to
the agent in consideration of his promise alone and he, without
consulting the owner, determined whether the prospect of payment
was such as to justify a sale upon credit. Consideration consisting
of such facts could not be proved by false testimony and, when
proved, affords substantial basis for the inference that the agent
was to stand back of his judgment that the purchaser would pay.
This inference, being corroborative of the plaintiff's claim, makes
it unnecessary to infer the defendant's promise solely from the
testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses.
Promises to indemnify. The decided preponderance of judicial
opinion is that a promise to indemnify is not within the statute.58
Practically all the cases acknowledge the source of this view to
be the statement of Bayley, J., in Thonms v. Cook"9 that "A
promise to indemnify does not .

.

.

fall within either the words

or the policy of the statute of frauds." This statement was unnecessary to the decision inasmuch as the only question was
whether the promise sued on was a promise "to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another." If it was not, the statute
was inapplicable. Unfortunately, courts have seemed to regard
the statement as correct and of importance. Quite often, if the
57Falconbridge, Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds, 68 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1, 17; 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 484; Browne, Statute of
Frauds,
5th ed., sec. 213.
58
Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., secs. 159-162; 1 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 482.
59(1828) 8 B. & C. 728, 3 Man. & Ry. 444, 7 L. J. 0. S. K. B. 49.
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promise alleged contains the word "indemnify" or "indemnity"
and the applicability of the statute is in question, the courts say
that the promise is a promise to indemnify and regard the applicability of the statute as necessarily decided. The statement
of Bayley, J., is made the major premise of a syllogism and, if
it is decided that the promise alleged is a promise to indemnify
60
the conclusion inevitably follows that it is not within the statute.
This method of approach is objectionable. Only promises to
answer for the "debts, defaults or miscarriages" of others are
within the statute and the sole inquiry should be whether the
promise alleged is such a promise. No practical harm, however,
would result if a "promise to indemnify" was never a "promise
to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of another." But
the former is a term of wider meaning than the latter and may
include it.61 Professor Williston has said:
"The greatest confusion exists in regard to the question
whether promises to indemnify are within the statute. It has
been pointed out that part of the confusion is due to an attempt
to treat all promises of indemnity alike, an attempt which is indicated in speaking of promises to indemnify, by emphasizing the
word 'indemnify' without consideration of the contingency against
which the promisor undertook to indemnify. A promise to
indemnify a creditor against loss if he sells goods to another, or
advances money to him, is certainly a promise to answer for the
debt or default of another, and of course within the statute; yet
the use of the word indemnify in such a transaction is entirely
proper. It is therefore a primary question whether the promisor
agrees, not merely to indemnify, but to indemnify for the debt,
default or miscarriage
of another. If not, there can be no question
' 62 of the statute.
If the statement of Bayley, J., is to be used as a premise from
which to reason as to the applicability of the statute, it should
be understood as referring to such a promise as was sued on in
60
"The promise is, in my opinion, clear; and the court below has
found that the promise was a promise to indemnify, and therefore
not within the Statute of Frauds. That decision is, in my opinion,
right, and therefore the appeal must be dismissed." Lindley, L. J., in
Guild & Co. v. Conrad, L1894] 2 Q. B. 885, 894, 63 L. J. Q. B. 721,

71 L. T. 140, 42 W. R. 642, 10 T. L. R. 549, 38 Sol. Jo. 579. "In my

opinion this was a promise to indemnify, and therefore not within
the statute." Davey, L. J., s. c. 896.
""Of course in one sense all guaranties, whether they come within
sec. 4 or not, are contracts of indemnity." Vaughan Williams, L. J.,
in Harburg Indian Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin, [1902] 1 K. B. 778,
784, 71 L. J.K. B. 529, 86 L. T. 505. 50 W. R. 449, 18 T. L. R. 428, 46

Sol. Jo. 357.
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Williston, Contracts, see. 482.
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Thomas v. Cook. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant induced him to join him as surety for a third person on
a bond to a fourth by orally promising to save him harmless. Eleven
years later, the plaintiff, in Green v. Creswell, alleged that the defendant induced him to become strety for a third person on a
bond to a fourth by orally promising to save him harmless,63 and
this promise was held to be within the statute. 64 In Wildes v. Dudlow"5 where the facts were practically identical, the promise was
held to be without the statute and it was said that Green v. Creswell
had been overruled by Reader v. Kinghamn. 6 6 It has been pointed
out that this was not necessarily the result of the latter case and a
few states now adhere to the rule of Green v. Creswell. The great
majority, however, profess allegiance to the broad statement of
Bayley, J., that a promise to indemnify is not within the statute.
It may be pertinent, therefore, to inquire whether this view is
correct. If so, it is not because such. promises are promises to
indemnify but because they are not promises to answer for the
debts or defaults of others or, if they are, the statute is inapplicable
because there are special circumstances accompanying or preceding
the promise, essential to its proof, that are unsusceptible to proof
by perjury and suggestive that the defendant probably made such
a promise as the plaintiff alleges.
There appears to be no difficulty where the promisor is alleged to have induced the promisee to become surety for him to C
by orally promising to indemnify or save him harmless. Such a
promise would be implied from the request, if followed by a compliance, and would give rise to the surety's right of exoneration.
A breach of this duty, followed by the surety's payment, entitles
him to reimbursement, generally called the surety's right of indemnity. It is generally agreed that such a promise is not within
63
1t is of prime importance to determine whether "indemnify"
or "save harmless" indicates that the promisor undertakes so to perform that the promisee will never be out of pocket or merely to reimburse him in case he is called upon to pay. The former was said
to be its meaning in Guild & Co. v. Conrad, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885, 894,
63 L. J. Q. B. 721, 71 L. T. 140, 42 W. R. 642, 10 T. L. R. 549 ,38 Sol.
Jo. 579. See Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and Statute of Frauds:
Thomas v. Cook versus Green v. Cresswell, 9 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
401.
64(1839) 10 Ad. & El. 453, 2 Per. & Day. 430, 9 L. J. Q. B. 63,
4 Jur. 169.
65(1874) L. R. 19 Eq. 198, 44 L. J. Ch. 341, 23 W. R. 435.
66(1862) 13 C. B. N. S. 344, 1 New Rep. 94, 32 L. J. C. P. 108,
7 L. T. 789, 9 Jur. N. S. 797, 11 W. R. 366.
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the statute. 7 Such a promise is to satisfy one's own obligation
and there is no obligation of another.
The confusion arises where it is alleged that the 'promisor induced the promisee to become surety for P by promising to save
him harmless or indemnify him. Such a promise is made for the
immediate purpose of inducing the promisee to become C's obligor,
as in the preceding case. But, in doing so, he becomes a prospective obligee of P, unless he enters into the relation officiously, enjoying against P immediately the rights of exoneration and indemnity. A promise to a debtor, as has seen seen, is not within the
statute and the same view should obtain as to a prospective debtor.
But a promise to a creditor, actual or prospective, to pay another's
debt is generally within the statute. It is this that has caused the
difficulty for those courts that follow Green v. Creswefl. When
the promisee accepts the offer by becoming surety for P, he becomes C's debtor and P's prospective creditor. Does the fact that
the latter consequence accompanies the former necessarily bring
the case within the statute? The promise is collateral to the implied promise of P but this feature has caused no difficulty in the
(.main purpose" and "del credere" cases and the writer believes
that, notwithstanding its existence in the so-called indemnity pi omises, they are correctly held to be without the statute. The danger
from perjury is absent because the plaintiff cannot establish the
promise without proving facts, preceding or accompanying it, that
are unsusceptible to proof by false testimony and that are indicative of an inducing promise by the defendant.
If the promise to indemnify is made after the promisee has
become surety for P, it would require a special consideration. If
the consideration alleged was some benefit moving to the promisor
from the promisee, it could hardly be proved contrary to fact and,
when proved, would itself suggest some sort of inducement by the
defendant. If the consideration were a mere detriment to the
promisee, it would be otherwise.
But the promise to indemnify is generally alleged to have induced the promisee to become surety for P. It is in these cases
that the difference of opinion has arisen. It must be admitted
that in the "indemnity" cases the promisor's plan to further some
purpose or desire of his own is somewhat less obvious than in the
"main purpose" and "del credere" cases, yet the danger contemplated by the statute appears to be absent.
C1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 482.
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If one receives goods upon request, he becomes a debtor and
the same result follows where goods are delivered to P at the
promisor's request. A promise to indemnify one who becomes
surety for the promisor at his request-generally agreed to be
without the statute-is analogous to the receipt of goods upon
request. The request that the promisee expose himself to a risk
for the benefit of the promisor by becoming his surety is enough
to impose the obligation to indemnify without an express promise.
If the promisor requests the promisee to become surety for P, in
whom the promisee may have no interest whatever, the request
may not be sufficient to constitute a basis for the implication of a
promise to indemnify in all cases but it is sufficiently indicative
that S promised to prevent the existence of the danger contemplated by the statute. Stated otherwise, the defendant's request
is not particularly susceptible to proof by perjury and, when established, it affords a basis for the inference that the person requesting probably agreed to save the person requested harmless.
This is so far corroborative of the plaintiff's claim that the inference that the defendant promised as alleged does not depend
solely on the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses.
Is there less reason to believe that the defendant promised to
indemnify the plaintiff, when the defendant requests him to become surety for P and P also requests him so that it is clear that
he also is bound to indemnify the plaintiff? In such a case, a single
consideration supports both promises as where goods are delivered by C to P for which both S and P promise to pay. It has
been seen that such a promise by S is not within the statute, even
though C knew that he promised in order to enable P to get the
goods. The promise of each was in the same terms and the resulting duty similar. In the case last supposed, when the promisee
becomes surety for P, his implied promise to save the plaintiff
harmless and the defendant's express promise are identical in
terms. Where the consideration gave rise to similar duties in the
promisor and another, it has been pointed out that the evil contemplated by the statute did not exist. Dishonest creditors alleged
that the consideration moved to P because the defendant promised
to pay, if P did not. But, in an indemnity promise, the more general view is that the terms of the defendant's promise are such that
they give rise to a duty similar to that of the person for whom the
plaintiff becomes bound. Where such consideration is in response
to the requests of both the defendant and P, there is reason to be-
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lieve that each undertakes to indemnify and the alleged promise of
the defendant cannot be within the statute because it is no more a
promise to pay another's debt than his own.
Conclusion. It is generally conceded that the removal of the
disqualification of parties as witnesses has greatly decreased the
need of written evidence of promises generally but the dishonest
plaintiff still appears to have a special advantage in an action
upon a false promise to pay another's debt because he needs to
prove only the promise by false testimony. But the writer doubts
whether creditors sue on promises, known to be false, sufficiently
often to create any substantial danger. The main usefulness of
the provision will be seen in the occasional case where the
promisee perhaps honestly mistakes "words of recommendation,
encouragement to forbearance or request for indulgence" for a
promise. Because there has been no general feeling that such
promises need be written, the provision may have operated more
often to enable debtors to escape performance of actual promises
than to protect them from spurious promises. Whether this actually
has been so or not is a matter about which there can be only conjecture. Much of the criticism of the statute undoubtedly has been
the result of a too literal interpretation of its language and its
consequent application to situations presenting none of the special
danger discussed in the foregoing pages. Whether, when properly confined, the provision will do more harm than good, can
be known only when the number of cases where written evidence
was essential to the defendant's protection has been compaied
with the number of cases where the requirement has enabled defendants to escape performance of actual promises.

